Gas work 'unrecognisable' to industry standard

Work done on gas pipes was "unrecognisable" when compared to industry standards, a court has heard.

A health and safety case against gas company Island Energy (IE), represented by chief executive Graeme Millar, is being heard over the deaths of 10 residents at the Haut du Mont flats in St Helier following the blast on 10 December 2022.

Gas workers Lee Ward, 59, Neil Armstrong, 58, and John Wright, 60, have also each pleaded not guilty to 10 counts of gross negligence manslaughter.

The jury was shown a video of gas engineers demonstrating how the work should have been carried out on the day before the explosion, including capping off a main pipe and a pressure test being mentioned.

The residents who died included:

• Peter Bowler, 72
• Billy Marsden, 62
• Derek Ellis, 61
• Sylvia Ellis, 73
• Ken Ralph, 72
• Jane Ralph, 71
• Romeu De Almeida, 67
• Louise De Almeida, 64
• Raymond Brown, 71
• Kathy McGinness, 73, who lived in a building adjacent to Haut du Mont, was taken to hospital and died on 25 December 2022

Prosecuting, Advocate Simon Thomas, said the defendants did not follow the IE procedures, omitting "several important stages".

Thomas said only one inflatable bag device was used, as opposed to two on either side of a rider, due to the excavation site being too small and only leaving space for one bag.

He said this was because Armstrong and Wright had not identified a larger excavation site was necessary.

One bag was therefore used to block gas at the upstream pipe before the pipe was cut "with no protection" from the downstream pipe, which was why a second bag was always needed in accordance with IE procedure, Thomas said.

The court heard Wright said he told investigators he had intended to use two bags but Armstrong had told him to "just get one with it", which "made him annoyed", the prosecution said.

Thomas said IE had a system in place "designed for such a situation" where an employee was entitled to demand that work stopped if they had safety concerns.

The system said "in some situations, stopping the job may prevent an injury, property damage or even save a life".

He said Wright did not practise those rights.

Thomas added that Wright told investigators he used a single bag even though he knew this was not IE practice.

He cut into the gas pipe with the protection of one bag, which Thomas said could fail, and, if it did fail, gas would immediately be released.

The prosecution said Wright "took these risks" to appease Armstrong.

Thomas added that the pipe that had been cut that flowed only to Haut du Mont was "just left" with no cap placed on it.

When signing off on the work done, a completed job report was filled out which questioned if work had been carried out "in accordance with IEG Codes of Practice", and the pressure test applied box was left blank.

The prosecution said work had not been carried out in accordance with IE's procedures and that the work done had been "unrecognisable" in comparison.

"Corners were cut and procedures were ignored," the court heard.

Thomas said that, although those deficiencies did not cause the explosion, it showed a disregard by Armstrong to follow proper procedures.

The prosecution said IE did not properly supervise what was going on and that there was no safe control of work system in place.

Following the work, which Armstrong what not present for, he said he went to Haut du Mont for about 20 minutes after 12:00 GMT.

He checked the emergency control valves in the gas cupboards to make sure gas had been successfully cut off from Haut du Mont.

Wright and assistant Luke Le Brocq then reportedly went for a cup of tea at the harbour following the work, but they were shortly contacted by St Helier Yacht Club, which had lost its gas supply.

The prosecution said a team was sent to investigate and confirmed gas had been cut off from the club and, upon further inspection, the gas supply had also been lost at seven properties at La Collette, including the DVS building and IE's own premises.

Due to the number of properties affected, a "flash alert" was issued to the Jersey Gas senior leadership team to make them aware that there was a problem.

The prosecution said it was understood that there was a "big event" happening at the yacht club and it would have to be cancelled if no gas was reinstated.

Thomas said there did not appear to be a function, but instead a misunderstanding on the part of Armstrong and others at IE - and that it "was not an emergency situation" and that there was "no reason to rush" to restore the building with gas as soon as possible.

Armstrong visited Haut du Mont for a second time that day at about 14:15 to check the emergency control valves were shut and plugged in the gas cupboards so gas could be reintroduced without danger, and was seen in the vicinity of the area in his car, the prosecution said.

Thomas said, however, that Armstrong was "preoccupied" during these checks with other matters, including onboarding a new staff member and taking a number of calls.

The prosecution argued it "begs the question" if Armstrong did check the valves as, when he left, there was "at least" one open and unplugged emergency control valve in one of the gas cupboards.

Thomas added it was "unclear" whether the valve was opened on the first or second of his visits.

He said: "If it had not been left open, then the explosion would not have happened.

"Mr Armstrong failed to ensure that all the ECVs [emergency control valves] were shut and plugged - his failure to do so was grossly negligent.

"This act of failing to close and plug at least one of those valves was truly exceptionally bad conduct on the part of Mr Armstrong."

When reinstating the gas supply, assistant Le Brocq was replaced by Ward at about 16:00.

Wright and Ward then worked together to reconnect the gas main that had been wrongly cut, but prosecution said it was "challenging" due to the too small excavation, which had to be extended.

Thomas said excavations did not reveal pipes leading to the riser or to Haut du Mont, which showed the two men did not know what they were working on.

He said that, rather than stopping and assessing, they continued work and no further excavations were carried out.

The court heard Wright and Thomas placed a single bag stop into the cast iron main that had been cut that morning to cut off the cap that had been fixed to it.

Armstrong then rejoined the two men and was working in a "rush" to get the gas reconnected.

Thomas said both Wright and Ward could have exercised their rights to demand that work stopped but they did not.

The court heard the pipework was reconnected and St Helier Yacht Club was with gas again - as was Haut du Mont.

The prosecution said, for the purpose of the charges of gross negligence manslaughter, that all three defendants reintroduced gas without carrying out a pressure test.

The trial continues.

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