Wetin be di next tin for Mali junta afta coordinated attacks wey kpai defence minister and recapture territory?

E dey hard to overstate di sense of shock wey dey reverberate across West Africa afta attackers, in co-ordinated assaults, manage to enta Mali capital, Bamako, assassinate di defence minister and recapture territory for di north.

Residents for different cities across di kontri bin wake to gunfire and explosions on Saturday - attack wey alliance of two groups - di separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and di al-Qaeda-linked JNIM group - say dem bin dey behind.

Di scale of di offensive and di withdrawal of Malian and Russian forces from di northern city of Kidal, now under FLA control, don fuel doubts about di strength of di military govment wey Col Assimi Goïta dey lead.

Goïta bin come into power for August 2020. E don take am several days to make appearance since di offensive, and dis don prompt questions about di junta future, as well as di role of Russian forces wey dey deployed to di Sahel to tackle di security threat.

Scenario 1: Junta go stay for power and fight back

Many analysts believe say dis remain di most likely short-term outcome, as di military still dey control major cities and towns as well as di state institutions.

But dem say di coming days fit dey critical as di army launch counter-offensive against JNIM and di FLA.

Im success or otherwise go "determine di longevity of di junta", according to Beverly Ochieng, wey be senior analyst for global consultancy firm Control Risks.

Three days afta di offensive, di presidency social media accounts don post fotos of Col Goïta meeting wit Russia ambassador to Mali, Igor Gromyko.

E also get fotos of di coup leader wey bin visit hospital wia dose wey wound for di attack dey receive treatment.

However, e neva issue statement about di situation and analysts say di death of Defence Minister Sadio Camara fit weaken military co-ordination and affect counter-offensive.

Camara death fit also hamper di relationship wit Russia, according to Ulf Laessing, head of di Sahel programme for di Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a centre-right German think tank.

Camara na one of di most powerful figures for di ruling structure and "di main interlocutor for Moscow and di brain behind di deployment of Russian mercenaries for di Sahel", e add.

While di Malian forces say dem dey fight to secure key parts of di kontri, dem go get struggle for dia hands as di FLA don signal ambitions south of Kidal.

"We wan take control of Gao city. All of Gao gates don fall, but di camps of di army neva fall," tok-tok pesin Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane tok.

E tell di BBC say di historic city of Timbuktu also dey on di radar: "E go dey easy to take ova once we fully control Gao and Kidal."

Di junta bin get popular support wen dem seize power nearly six years ago, as dem promise to deal wit Mali long-running security crisis.

But JNIM fuel blockade don already force dem into a defence position ova di last year as militants broaden dia insurgency to include economic warfare.

If armed groups manage to sustain advance, Mali fit face prolonged conflict, and e go affect di future of di junta.

Scenario 2: Junta go stay for power wit Russian support but seek new partners

Last weekend attacks don also damage Russia image as reliable security partner for Mali, Ochieng tok.

Following di military takeover for di beginning of di decade, dem tell French forces, wey don dey support di army, to leave and Russian fighters replace dem to help curb di insurgency.

Now di Russians reputation "don take huge blow" afta di failure of dia Africa Corps to defend major cities and di fall of Kidal, Laessing add.

While sticking wit Russian support, Mali fit dey pushed to widen dia military partnerships.

One possible option fit involve closer ties wit Turkey, wey don dey seek to expand dia influence for Africa.

Ochieng say reports don dey about one Turkish security contact wey dey deployed "to train di presidential guard" for Mali.

Turkey already get defence ties wit Mali, supplying dem wit drones wey reportedly play decisive role in helping di military take back Kidal for 2024.

Mali don also show signs of renewed engagement wit di US afta years of strained relations.

Earlier dis year, Nick Hocker, head of di State Department African affairs section, bin travel to express US "respect for Mali sovereignty" and outline one "new course" in relations, aimed at moving "past policy missteps".

E also say di US intend to work more closely with Mali neighbours and allies, Burkina Faso and Niger, on shared security and economic priorities.

Bamako fit also lean more heavily on di Alliance of Sahel States (AES), wey bring togeda Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso - all military-led govments.

Di bloc don pledge support for Mali, though dem neva act as major joint fighting force.

For Russia, di key question na weda dem fit maintain influence if Mali diversify dia security ties.

Di crisis fit also become a test of dia wider strategy for Africa, wia Moscow don expand influence through military partnerships.

If Russian-backed forces dey seen as unable to protect key allies, oda govments for di region fit reconsider how much dem dey rely on Moscow.

Scenario 3: Pressure go force junta from power - but who go take ova?

Saturday attacks don create di most serious challenges to military rule in years.

Further attacks fit intensify pressure on di military govment as public discontent dey grow.

One possible outcome na anoda military coup, wit a different group of officers taking power.

Alternatively, one FLA-JNIM alliance fit replace di current govment but e go face serious international tensions.

Di FLA present diasef as political and nationalist movement, JNIM na armed Islamist group.

Mali separatist and Islamists group don get on-off relationship for years - going back to 2012 wen di ethnic Tuareg separatist rebellion bin dey hijacked by Islamist militants.

One FLA tok-tok pesin earlier describe JNIM fighters as dia "cousins", and add say "we share di same enemy, so we gatz dey under di same umbrella".

But FLA leader Sayed Bin Bella later tell di BBC say "merger no dey".

"All di flags wey we don raise na our own, no be for for al-Qaeda. If dem wish to merge wit us, dem gatz withdraw from di global al-Qaeda organisation," e tok.

Analysts say dis differences fit complicate any future power-sharing arrangement.

JNIM don largely avoid di openly global jihadist rhetoric wey often dey associated wit al-Qaeda and similar groups, Ochieng tok.

She say possibly outcome fit be Syria-type situation wia one group wey bin once dey affiliated to al-Qaeda take power.

Syria leadership don dey criticised by some hard-line Islamists say dem dey too secular.

Similar accusations don already dey directed at JNIM becos of dia alliance wit di FLA, analysts wey dey monitor jihadist media channels don report.

However, differences in ideology between JNIM and di FLA fit become a future source of tension, unless di separatists secure full control of di north and distance demsefs from developments elsewia for di kontri.